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THE PHENOMENON OF MEDIEVAL IUS COMMUNE:  
THE PAST OF EUROPE’S LEGAL FUTURE?
Tadas Lukošius1
Abstract. The historical approach enables us to perceive the specific legal phenomenon as continuous and 
to study the antecedents of current (or even future) legal challenges. This article discusses the possibilities 
of invoking the historical notion of ius commune (and various new concepts based on it) in a contemporary 
legal discourse on the future of the European Union (EU) law. Since issues of integrity and homogeneity 
remain central to the consideration of further legal developments of the EU legal framework it is especially 
relevant to look back at one of the most prominent phenomena in the Western legal tradition – ius com-
mune, which to some extent united legal thought throughout pre-modern Europe. By analysing inherent 
characteristics related to its sources, methods and interaction with other (local) legal systems, we attempt 
to define the limits of such historical analogy. This may allow answering the questions as to whether and to 
what extent the model of medieval-originated ius commune could inspire further development of the EU 
legal framework (as a new ius commune).
Keywords: Roman law, canon law, medieval legal systems, legal history.
What has been will be again,
what has been done will be done again;
there is nothing new under the sun.
Is there anything of which one can say,
“Look! This is something new”?
It was here already, long ago;
it was here before our time.
(Ecclesiastes, Ch. 1:9--10)
INTRODUCTION
It is often said, both seriously or with humour, that history tends to repeat itself. Even without 
arguing about the specific theoretical concepts of historic recurrence or cyclical nature of history, such 
a statement – transferred in the context of Western law – at least reminds us about the important 
link between the historical approach and consideration of the future. The historical perspective en-
ables researcher to perceive the specific legal phenomenon as continuous, to study the antecedents 
of current legal challenges and to draw new scenarios of how the law could (or sometimes should) 
develop. The claim that the history of law is the basis of legal prediction should not be reduced to a 
mere beautiful-sounding phrase (which allegedly has no real value). As some scholars note, the lat-
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ter approach of undermining the benefits of historical analysis is dangerous and makes a significant 
contribution to the spread of legal nihilism (Machovenko, 2013, p. 11).
Historical analogies are being widely used in contemporary legal discourse on today’s and future’s 
law. One of the most prominent examples in this field is a historical concept of ius commune – a Latin 
term that refers to the common European legal culture and ideas that once existed. In recent decades 
this historical notion has been extensively applied in a variety of legal contexts. There were calls for 
the EU jurists to pay more attention to comparative studies to successfully recreate the European 
ius commune (Pennington, 1997, p. 1115). Ius Commune Research School has been established in 
Maastricht where researchers combine their efforts in a search for a common ground of various 
national legal systems in Europe2. Legal scholars employ this historical concept when talking about 
the initiatives of harmonising Europe’s private law (Caenegem, 2004, 28-30), discussing the future of 
legal education (Padoa-Schioppa, 2017, p. 687) or the need of closer legal and academic co-operation 
between the national states (Markesinis, 1994, p. 2). Such are just a few of many examples. Moreover, 
the historical concept of ius commune inspired scholars to coin even new terms. For instance, ad-
ministrative law researchers talk about the development of transnational ius commune proceduralis 
(Pünder, 2013, p. 960-961), constitutional law researchers examine the concept of ius constitutionale 
commune (Soley et al., 2017). Eventually, to highlight the differences from the historical ius commune, 
terms such as “new ius commune” (Koopmans, 1992, p. 49), “ius commune 2.0” or “ius commune 
3.0” (Giesen, 2013, p. 159-161) were introduced in the contemporary legal lexicon.
Since historical ius commune was associated with European legal developments, this term 
(in various forms) nowadays is mostly used to justify the need for further harmonisation (or even 
unification) processes within the European legal framework. Thus, the pre-modern ius commune 
Europaeum may become a convenient point of referance for historical analogy when considering 
possible future scenarios for the EU law. Moreover, the ideas of “ever closer union” are still rever-
berating across Europe. Few years ago, in 2017 the European Commission published its White Paper 
on the Future of Europe, where five possible future scenarios for EU by 2025 were indicated (White 
Paper on the Future…, 2017). One of the most noticeable – the fifth scenario – was called “Doing 
much more together” where the cooperation between all Members States goes further than ever 
before in all domains, without excluding the legal one. In this context it may seem tempting to portray 
ius commune as a historical precedent that can be “revived” in a strengthened, more cohesive and 
unified future legal framework of the EU. As if the history should repeat itself once again. However, 
the inaccurate application of historical analogies may pose additional problems. It could not only 
undermine the argumentation (for which such historical analogy was applied) but also encourage 
the teleological approach to history, meaning that the complexities of the past could sometimes be 
ignored to justify the present purpose (when history is read “backwards”).
This paper analyses the possibilities of applying a historical concept of ius commune in contem-
porary legal discourse. The purpose of this article is to estimate whether and to what extent the 
2  More information about the activities of Ius Commune Research School is presented in the website www.iuscom-
mune.eu. 
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concept of historical ius commune could be used in discussions on the future development of the 
EU legal framework (as a new ius commune). For this aim the study is divided in four parts. The first 
part analyses preconditions for an analogy between the historical ius commune and EU legal frame-
work. The second part then introduces the very notion of historical ius commune. Finally, the third 
and fourth parts examine the distinctive features of historical ius commune (as regards its sources, 
methods and interplay with other legal systems) which determine the spectrum of application of 
this historical concept in contemporary legal discourse on the future of EU law.
In the research analysis we present our views that the historical referral to ius commune (or any 
usage of new legal concepts based thereon) must take into account the peculiarities of this legal 
phenomenon and simultaneously should not be loosely applied to substantiate any harmonisation 
or unification efforts within the EU legal framework.
1. PRECONDITIONS FOR A HISTORICAL ANALOGY 
Every analogy between two phenomena requires some common ground as a basis for comparison. 
Naturally, the question may first arise whether the juxtaposition of centuries-old legal phenomena 
of ius commune to the 21st century law of the EU is valid at all.
There is no doubt that the EU has created a unique legal framework that operates at the supra-
national level and has no analogies in the contemporary world. Some scholars highlight the EU’s legal 
system as a striking example of the post-modern type of law that is gradually emerging and that could 
be described as a global, based on common human values, developed at the transnational level with 
its application mostly by national authorities (Machovenko, 2013, 37-38). Indeed, the challenges that 
the EU and its legal system have been facing lately may be described as new, unique and even world-
wide. The development of new technologies vs. the need for the adequate protection of personal 
data; fostering the single market and economic growth vs. coping with climate change; safeguarding 
the human rights vs. managing the migration crisis or fighting the current coronavirus pandemic - 
such and many more complex questions had not been encountered by any previous legal system.
On the other hand, the issues of integrity and homogeneity remain central to the consideration 
of the future of EU law. Despite the fact, that the EU has created a unique sui generis legal order – a 
model of shared sovereignty where relations between the Member States and EU levels constantly 
develop – deep-rooted tensions between national and supranational (EU) legal systems have not 
vanished anywhere. Moreover, such tensions are periodically reflected in the legal institutes of the 
EU itself.
One of the most eloquent examples is the doctrine of supremacy of EU law, where both European 
Court of Justice and national courts emphasise different legal grounds for the supremacy of EU law 
(Craig, Búrca, 2015, p. 313-314). Issues pertaining to the boundaries of EU competence is another 
example. There is an ongoing problem of so called “competence creep” with regard to the “flexibility“ 
clause (Article 352 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) or harmonisation 
clause (Article 114 of the TFEU) which also raise concerns about over extensive of EU’s legislative 
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competence (Craig, Búrca, 2015, p. 93). Finally, tensions between national and supranational legal 
systems leave their traces in various political issues, such as the constant rise of nationalist rhetoric, 
Brexit or lasting non-compliance by some Member States with the general principles of the EU law.
However, as the abovementioned tensions in recent years have led to a rethink of the future 
development of the EU, one should remember that the same EU legal system has emerged and 
continues to function in the context of a long-standing Western legal tradition.
The latter has formed as an outcome of the Investiture Controversy – a revolutionary process of 
late 11th and early 12th centuries, during which secular and ecclesiastical spheres finally separated 
from one another throughout Catholic Europe (Berman, 1999, 121-124). As prominent legal historian 
Harold J. Berman has emphasised, a Western legal tradition for many centuries has been character-
ised by certain inherent characteristics. The most distinctive of them was named as “coexistence and 
competition within the same community of diverse jurisdictions and diverse legal systems” (Berman, 
1999, 26). In the context of the contemporary EU legal framework, such feature strongly resonates 
with the aforementioned tensions between the national and supranational levels. A constant struggle 
between the ideals and realities (the dynamic qualities and stability) – another typical feature of 
Western legal tradition (Berman, 1999, 27) – also reflects the current state of affairs for the EU. As 
European Commission indicated in its White Paper on the Future of Europe, “change in all things may 
be inevitable, but what we want from our lives and the European values that we hold dear remain 
the same.” (White Paper on the Future…, 2017). This struggle encourages the constant process of 
renewal, but its mismanagement could lead to the collapse of the whole legal system.
Finally, Western legal tradition presupposes the conviction of ongoing character of law. Moreover, 
all changes in Western law do not occur simply random – they are results of constant (re)interpreta-
tion of the past in order to meet the needs of today and tomorrow (Berman, 1999, 25-26). Accord-
ingly, the future development of the EU legal system should not be considered as a process that is 
somewhat “beyond” of or simply “unrelated” to the legal past. As the EU law develops it (either 
consciously or unconsciously) employ legal concepts and models that were created many years ago. 
Some scholars notice, that in order for the facts of legal history to speak to us today more clearly, 
they should be “cleaned” from the specifics of their time (e.g. from the specific historical language, 
conjuncture, etc.), leaving only a “pure”, essential legal concept (Machovenko, 2013, 11). It may then 
become clear that the old legal institute, established many centuries ago, is essentially analogous 
to today’s legal constructs.
Since ius commune also arose within the Western legal tradition (as it will be seen in the later part 
of this paper), the latter could serve as a common denominator for the historical analogy between 
this ius commune Europaeum and contemporary EU’s legal order. Despite the significant time-period 
gap between the two, both such legal phenomena faced the fundamental challenges inherent in the 
entire Western legal tradition. Thus, the historical analogy of centuries-old ius commune could lead 
to a fruitful consideration of the future development of the EU law.
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2. THE NOTION OF THE HISTORICAL  IUS COMMUNE
Some of the authors, who invoke the concept of ius commune in contemporary legal analysis, 
as well as other legal scholars often tend to characterise ius commune by assigning to it short good-
sounding labels. Among some of the most common are “shared legal culture”, (Heirbaut, Storme, 
2010, p. 21), “common law of continental Europe” (Mousarakis, 2015, p. 23), “common legal heritage 
of European countries” (Giesen, 2013, 160) or even “a law potentially common to all” (Herzog, 2018, 
p. 87). Without a proper context, these simplified labels may give the impression that Europe once 
lived under the sole legal framework and was legally united. However, that would be completely 
contrary to historical reality.
As a European legal phenomenon, ius commune emerged from the revival of legal thought in 
the late 11th and 12th centuries. Legal historians sometimes refer to this period as to “Renaissance 
of law” to highlight significant progress from the previous era (which is sometimes gloomily called 
as “an age without jurists”) (Bellomo, 1995, 34, 52). During this time two unique European legal 
systems – medieval Roman law and canon law – began to form.
Following the rediscovery of the pivotal sources of Roman law (Corpus Iuris Civilis) and the 
establishment of the first European universities (starting with the University of Bologna), Roman 
law – which was a “dead” legal system at that time (!) – has become an independent subject taught 
at universities. Almost at the same time (starting from around the middle of the 12th century when 
the monk named Gratian finished his magnum opus named in its abbreviated form as Decretum) the 
canon law of the Catholic Church has emerged as a separate legal system. Even though canon law 
has existed for centuries until then, the early law of the Church in the first millennia has never been 
systematised (Berman, 1999, p. 268-273) and differed in significant degree from what it became in 
12th and later centuries (historians who specialise in the subject often contrast this ius novum (“the 
new law of the Church”) or classical canon law era with the ius antiquum (“the old law of the Church”) 
that preceded it) (Helmholz, 2010, p. 4-5).
Medieval Roman law and new canon law systems had some distinctive features. Unlike other 
medieval legal systems of that time, both of them were not “enframed” by the criteria such as ter-
ritory, estate and (or) subject matter. On the contrary, Roman law and canon law were recognised 
as extraterritorial (in their applicability) and universal (in their scope) legal systems. They were not 
limited to a particular estate of the realm. Moreover, for centuries both Roman and canon law were 
taught in universities as separate subjects.
Probably one of the most important features that led to the formation of ius commune was a 
close interaction between the two systems from the very outset. Civil and canon lawyers studied each 
other’s sources and exchanged ideas between themselves, the title Iuris utriusque doctor (i.e. the 
doctor of both Roman and civil law) was being bestowed at universities by the end of 12th century. 
In fact, it ultimately became impossible to thoroughly understand canon law without studying Ro-
man law and vice versa – such circumstance is well reflected in a centuries old maxim “legista sine 
canonibus parum valet, canonista sine legibus nihil” (i.e. a civil lawyer without knowledge of canon 
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law is worth little, a canon lawyer without knowledge of Roman law is worth nothing) (Pennington, 
2017, p. 249-255).
Thus, throughout the Middle Ages this convergence of Roman and canon law gave a start to ius 
commune – a law common to all university-trained jurists (Helmholz, 2010, p. 20). Some scholars 
also tend to enrich the definition of ius commune (which was centred around roman-canon law) by 
adding the main elements of other legal systems that were perceived as common throughout Europe 
at that time. Such examples include feudal law (Bellomo, 1995, p. x) (Libri Feudorum – a collection 
of feudal customs of Lombardy – was even integrated as part of the Corpus Iuris Civilis (Stein, 2004, 
p. 61)) or royal law of secular territorial kingdoms, which was characterised everywhere by its nine 
distinctive features (Berman, 1999, p. 537-539). During the times of legally fragmented Europe (before 
the emergence of nation-states with their own national law), ius commune proposed some common 
ground for jurists: it functioned as a platform for sharing legal concepts, terminology and techniques 
between legal scholars and students. After all, it was thought that ius commune Europaeum was 
based directly on reason (ratio iuris) and thus could be applied as a criterion for judging things as 
right or wrong (Helmholz, 2010, p. 87).
The scale of ius commune could also be portrayed by determining its position with reference to 
other legal phenomena. As a part of larger Western legal tradition ius commune simultaneously was 
more general, greater than particular legal systems and terrestrial legal practices that existed at the 
same time (so-called local laws of the land). Thus, as a legal phenomenon, ius commune could be 
depicted somewhere between the whole Western legal tradition and various local legal systems of 
different cities, counties, duchies, principalities or kingdoms.
Ius commune dominated the European legal landscape for centuries until the slow process of 
separating Roman and canon law has commenced in the 16th and 17th centuries. Protestant Reforma-
tion, a rise of nation-states and the increasing focus on teaching national law gradually diminished the 
significance of ius commune. By the end of 18th century Roman law and canon law finally detached 
from one another (Pennington, 2017, p. 257) and ius commune – once presented as ratio iuris – had 
to concede its influence to new rationalism and “codistic” vision of law (Bellomo, 1995, p. 4-6, 32). 
As some scholars notice, in today’s Europe the same vision, which encourages “one nation, one state, 
one code of law” and which does not tolerate any legal fragmentation, still prevails (Caenegem, 
2004 p. 22-23). These peculiarities must be borne in mind when comparing legal phenomena from 
different eras.
3. SOURCES AND METHODS OF  IUS COMMUNE
Ius commune centred around the pivotal texts of Roman and canon law. For medieval Roman 
law it was Justinian’s codification which was put together in the middle of 6th century by the Eastern 
Roman emperor Justinian I (later, in 16th century such codification was named as Corpus Iuris Civilis). 
Corpus Iuris Civilis consisted of 4 parts: Codex (collection of imperial enactments), Digest (collection 
of juristic writings), Institutions (student textbook) as well as Novellae (new imperial laws enacted 
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after the Codex). From the beginning it was supposed to be a comprehensive codification, meaning 
that no law could exist outside such corpus. To ensure the “purity” of the original text, Justinian 
even prohibited any elaboration of legal commentaries (Herzog, 2018, p. 32). Thus, medieval jurists 
who studied Roman law, confronted with texts of Corpus Iuris Civilis that not only were old (and 
as such no longer corresponded to realities of new era) but also were “frozen in time”: once col-
lected, adjusted and adopted in the 6th century, they were no longer substantially changed. It can 
be concluded, that rediscovered Roman law was in principle a “departed” legal system that took a 
lot of effort to revive.
Canon law, on the contrary, was a functioning legal system. It was not only applied at the canonical 
courts and other church institutions throughout the Catholic Europe but also constantly developed 
through the adoption of new papal acts. Nevertheless, the ius novum (new law of the church) that 
emerged in the 12th century, was also based on some crucial texts, such as collections of papal 
decretals (litterae decretales), i. e. papal decisions on specific practical issues, that formed new com-
mon rules of conduct (papal decretals could be considered as legal precedents (Machovenko, 2013, 
p. 241)). Such collections were formed during the period of the 12th – 15th centuries. Finally, in the 
16th century, these canonical texts were officially sanctioned by the pope and printed under the title 
of Corpus Iuris Canonici (to distinguish it from secular corpus of Roman law).
It could be said, that both Corpora Iuris formed a “backbone” of the ius commune and marked 
a static aspect of its sources. The text of these secular and ecclesiastical collections and the legal 
provisions contained therein have not changed over time.
At the same time, ius commune was shaped by the dynamic properties of its sources. The revival 
of law in medieval Europe was marked by the common understanding that in order to achieve jus-
tice, there must be something outside the lex. Otherwise – in the words of Cicero – summum ius, 
summa iniuria, i. e. the rigorous law could only lead to rigorous injustice. Moreover, some centuries 
old legal texts needed additional explanations in order to bring them to the new realities. Thus, 
starting from the outset of the ius commune, the civil and canon law jurists (legista and canonista) 
have created numerous commentaries (jurisprudence) that allowed to interpret the letter of law in 
a new perspective. Most importantly, the emerging jurisprudence allowed the interaction between 
civil and canon law and paved the way for ius commune to be taught at the universities (e.g. in the 
middle of the 12th century Gratian, who is titled as the father of the science of canon law, wrote his 
famous work Decretum as a textbook for students (Pennington, 2014, p. 683)).
More and more synonyms for ius commune appeared in the national languages: learned law, 
droit savant, Juristenrecht or das gelehrte Recht, el derecho docto (Bellomo, 1995, p. 81), just to 
mention a few examples. All of the above mentioned names highlight the scientific character of this 
legal phenomenon, which was first associated with scientific law. Some authors even describe it as a 
“law of professors”, emphasizing that at least in civil-law countries the professors in the Law Faculties 
for centuries were the most important makers of the law (Caenegem, 2004, p. 45).
Moreover, the longevity and viability of ius commune were ensured by the unique interpreta-
tive methods. Although legal grammar (Corpora Iuris) mainly remained the same for centuries, 
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interpretative methods constantly differed. For example, different schools for commenting Roman 
law sources have emerged, developed, coexisted and overshadowed each other over time. After 
the rediscovery of Roman law texts, they were seen from the perspective of scholastic method, 
i.e. as libri legales par excellance, which must be interpreted as if they do not (and cannot) contain 
any internal contradictions. Such a view was adopted by the first legal school of glossators (end of 
11th – 14th centuries) (Urbanavičiūtė, 2009, p. 110-111). The latter was gradually replaced by the new 
school of commentators or post-glossators (14th – 15th centuries), which also emphasised the need 
for practical adaptability of legal texts to changing realities (Urbanavičiūtė, 2009, p. 129). Finally, in 
15th, 16th and later centuries new methodological trends emerged and European jurisprudence began 
to branch off from one another: e.g., humanistic jurisprudence, the “Secunda Scholastica” (Bellomo, 
1995, p. 204-206, 223-226), Usus modernus Pandectarum and topical method used by protestant 
jurists (Berman, 2006, p. 100-102, 108-111) ensured that attitudes toward the ius commune legal 
texts would undergo constant review. Numerous legal commentaries, written by ius commune jurists, 
not only enabled to study them in universities all across Europe but gradually became indispensable 
in the practical application of both Roman and canon law. Given the importance of jurisprudence, ius 
commune can in no way be considered only from a positive legal perspective alone.
Thus, one of the most striking features of ius commune is that for centuries this legal phenom-
enon derived its authority from its own scientific character and not from political power – be it 
secular or ecclesiastical (Coing, 1986, p. 489). Ius commune jurisprudence was constantly developed, 
changed and rebuilt by the initiative of private jurists who believed that ius commune texts (mainly 
both Corpora Iuris) reflect objective reason (ratio iuris). This eloquent characteristic rejects any 
direct connections between ius commune and state-centred legal positivism. It also presupposes 
that historical analogy of ius commune concept cannot be invoked in order to justify the process 
of uniforming the Member States’ law by simply adopting new positive legal instruments – such 
as EU regulations, directives or court decisions – “from above”. On the other hand, a model of ius 
commune may serve as an inspiring example of how EU legal thought (with its principles, terms, 
concepts, and techniques) could strengthen its influence in harmonising certain areas of national 
legal systems by the means of promoting the development of EU legal science and common legal 
education based on it.
4. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN  IUS COMMUNE  AND  IURA PROPRIA
The idea that ius commune embodied a unifying legal thought throughout Europe does not mean 
that medieval and pre-modern Europe itself was legally unified. On the contrary, at the local (land) 
level Europe lived under broad variety of heterogeneous jurisdictions. Moreover, local legal systems 
coexisted, overlapped and competed with one another within the same territory. Such pluralistic 
legal constellation of different kingdoms, principalities, cities or corporations are often called by legal 
historians as iura propria (i.e. particular laws, as opposed to ius commune). Iura propria encompassed 
different secular legal systems (or parts thereof), such as feudal, manorial, mercantile, urban or royal 
law, that often varied depending on different locations (Mousarakis, 2015, p. 52-53).
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At first sight the interaction between iura propria and ius commune may resemble the contem-
porary cohesion of national (Member States’) and supranational (EU) legal systems. However, such 
an assessment would be too hasty. 
There is no doubt, that ius commune was tightly related to iura propria. The first strongly af-
fected the second: after all, ius commune was extraterritorial, universal in its scope of regulation, 
comprehended as more perfect and more rational than a wide variety of local legal practices. More-
over, since ius commune was taught at universities (unlike ius proprium), more and more students 
received knowledge of the same legal principles, terminology, institutes, and, more generally, the 
way of thinking about law. After graduating from universities, and returning to their homeland, 
these jurists worked with local laws by developing, modifying, interpreting and applying them in 
the light of ius commune concepts. And despite the fact, that ius commune was used in local secular 
courts only as a residual law, where the local laws did not provide with any specific solutions (e.g. 
Roman-canon legal provisions were used to fill the gaps of the particular local system (Coing, 1986, 
p. 489)), ius commune retained its influence on iura propria. The eloquent example of such influence 
is legislation of King Roger II (first part of the 12th century), ruler of Norman Kingdom of Sicily and 
founder of the first modern system of royal law (Berman, 1999, p. 551). King Roger’s Constitutions 
already contained multiple conceptual and verbal borrowings from Roman law texts references to 
the Roman law texts and terminology – this shows that King Roger’s jurists even at that early stage 
had access and understanding about the main Roman law texts (Pennington, 2006, p. 40). In the 
words of the famous Italian legal historian Manlio Bellomo, ius commune influences terrestrial iura 
propria just like the sun affects its planets: they orbit around the sun but at the same time the latter 
does not suppress their unique local environments (Belomo, 1995, p. 192-193).
However, the relationship between ius commune and iura propria was not simply one-sided. 
Such interaction was highly reciprocal and dialectical. First of all, apart from universities (and in part 
church institutions that developed and direcly applied canon law), ius commune itself did not have 
any institutional framework, such as courts or legislative bodies. As mentioned above, it was driven 
by medieval-originated academic tradition based on private scholarly initiative and in this sense was 
viable and dynamic. Secondly, ius commune ideas spread unevenly throughout Europe due to local 
specificities. For example, the reception of ius commune in France was not uniform, since the whole 
country was divided into two regions: northern part was long dominated by the local customs (pays 
de droit coutumier) while the southern part was strongly influenced by written Roman law (pays de 
droit écrit) (Mousarakis, 2015, 54-55). Or unlike English law, Scots law was more open to ius com-
mune and its concepts, since many Scots jurists until the 18th century acquired their legal education 
in Continental universities (MacQueen, 2000). Finally, ius commune itself was strongly affected by 
different local legal cultures in different territories. For instance, in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, a 
highly intense legal pluralism and coexistence of a wide variety of legal systems determined a unique 
and creative interpretation of ius commune provisions: inter alia, it allowed to secure a democratic 
regime for the nobility and to ensure a highly flexible model of legal regulation (Machovenko, 2014, 
p. 111-112).
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And even though some “version” of ius commune by the 16th century was present almost every-
where in Europe (Herzog, 2018, p. 88), the above mentioned different local legal panoramas meant 
that interpretation, applicability and even further development of ius commune also varied. Thus, it 
could be said that over time ius commune became fragmented. In other words, ius commune cannot 
be perceived as a centralised, seamless, consistent and monolithic legal order, that simply “covered” 
highly jurisdictionally fragmented pre-modern Europe over centuries. Even though ius commune 
maintained its uniting elements, it has also become pluralistic in its nature (like the iura propria).
In our view, the notion of ius commune cannot serve as a historical argument for promoting 
further uniformity within the EU legal framework and at the same time reducing heterogeneity of 
different (national) legal systems. Ius commune may appeal to the legal harmonisation provided that 
such harmonisation is limited to the level of legal ideas, principles, concepts terminology and the way 
of legal thinking (most importantly – legal science). At the same time, the notion of ius commune 
highlights the continuous (never-ending) dialectical interplay of unity (an ambition to create com-
mon legal culture) and diversity (legal polycentricity), where neither of these elements completely 
eliminates the other. Interestingly, this balance is also clearly reflected in the current official moto 
of the EU – in varietate concordia (unity in diversity). Therefore, when considering those future 
scenarios of the development of EU and its legal framework where legal unity is not built solely at 
the expense (and denial) of legal diversity, the historical concept of ius commune can serve as an 
antecedent model for the creation (or revival) of the new ius commune.
CONCLUSIONS
1.  The common ground of the Western legal tradition provides the justification for the historical 
analogy between the two legal phenomena of different eras – ius commune and current EU 
legal system. Such historical juxtaposition (both direct or indirect, i.e. through new concepts 
and terminology constructed based on historical notion of ius commune) may be invoked in the 
contemporary legal discourse as a source of inspiration.
2.  However, the distinctive features of historical ius commune presuppose certain limitations of the 
use of this concept (or its derivatives) in the contemporary discourse about the future of EU law. 
At least the following caveats must be heeded:
2.1.  Ius commune indicates that to achieve a viable, lasting and balanced legal framework the 
emphasis must be shifted from political authorities to legal science (jurisprudence) and legal 
education. Thus, the use of such a historical model cannot substantiate the aspirations for 
strengthening the EU legal framework through the instruments of positive law.
2.2.  Ius commune may only serve as a model of legal harmonisation which is limited to its extent. 
Far from being uniform legal phenomenon itself, ius commune reflects the idea of legal 
polycentricity (legal pluralism) which is not compatible with the legal monopoly of state (or 
EU) cantered legal order.
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2.3.  The notion of historical ius commune does not implicate the reduction (or elimination) of 
dialectical interaction (which at some point may turn into tensions) between supranational 
and local legal systems. On the contrary, the reciprocal relationship between ius commune 
and iura propria (local laws of the land) highlights the continuity of such interplay, where 
neither of these elements completely eliminates the other.
3.  Even though the pre-modern concept of ius commune may serve as an antecedent model for the 
discussions on further developments of EU legal framework (or parts of it, such as legal education, 
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